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"naturally" harmonious, then there is no need of negotiation and bargaining. All that is needed is exact measurement, as in the physical sciences.

The other definition of democracy is such an arrangement as "gives the workers power and opportunities, as compared with the employers, to express and advance their viewpoint and enforce their demands" (pp. 103, 104). This is the democracy of equality of bargaining power. Such democracy does not exist in scientific management shops at their best, for "the power of the individual worker against the employer is weakened" (p. 104) and "with rare exceptions" unionism and collective bargaining do not exist (p. 109).

Other topics covered by the book are the incompleteness and hurry of installation of scientific management, "functional foremanship," selection and hiring, instruction and training, specialization of workers, rate-making, modes of payment, maintenance of rates, overexertion and exhaustion, advancement and promotion, discipline, discharge and length of service, industrial democracy, and collective bargaining. To discuss them all would require several papers. They cover, we may say, almost the whole trend of modern business with reference to labor.

Whether it be called scientific management, or something else, the fact is that it is part of a resistless movement for business efficiency which cannot be suppressed either by labor or by government. The union that suppresses it will drive business to non-union shops, and the government that suppresses it will succumb to other nations. Seeing this outcome, Hoxie holds that "the main demands are for a frank recognition of the trend of events and for some method of putting back into the worker's life the content which he is losing as the result of increasing specialization and the abandonment of the old apprenticeship."

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*Inventors and Money-Makers. Lectures on Some Relations between Economics and Psychology.* By F. W. TAUSSIG. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Pp. ix+138.

These three semi-popular lectures constitute in the main a criticism of the Utilitarian contention that a conscious self-interest must be at the basis of all wealth production. The argument is interesting as an illustration of the influence which biology is coming to exert upon economic theory, for its final appeal is to man's instinctive equipment. The

Utilitarian assumption of the "economic man" is rejected because the author cannot discover any instincts of accumulation and barter (pp. 4, 81). He does contend, however, that man possesses an instinct of contrivance or workmanship which will better explain his inventiveness than will his desire for wealth, though the latter stimulus has not been inoperative among inventors. With the business man also the desire for wealth has been a very strong motive to accumulation, but this desire is not a simple instinct of accumulation. It is rather a composite of the instincts of contrivance, domination, emulation, and sympathy or altruism, which demand wealth for their satisfaction (pp. 79 ff.).

While the author believes his stand against the Utilitarian economics well taken, he has not sufficient faith in the instinct of contrivance to advocate the abolishment of the patent laws (p. 52). Neither is he an unqualified advocate of collectivism as a substitute for the competitive system, for he is doubtful whether the instinct of altruism will be able completely to overcome the opposing instincts of emulation and domination. However, the experience of the nineteenth century has shown that the last two instincts can be greatly modified by training, and therefore a large measure of collectivism is not unthinkable for the future (pp. 125, 133-34).

An adequate criticism of this book cannot be made in a few words. However, the reviewer takes issue with the method of the argument rather than with the author's major conclusions, and this criticism of method may be outlined in two general propositions: First, every fact here explained by means of an appeal to instinct could have been accounted for equally well—and sometimes with greater clearness—on the basis of habits acquired through training. Secondly, all the arguments used in the book to establish the existence of the instincts appealed to are equally applicable if we substitute for the word "instinct" the term "acquired habit." The author seems to have fallen into the methodological error now so common among biologists of referring to well-established and widespread habits as native tendencies or instincts, apparently on the assumption that whatever is common to the race must have been born in the individual rather than have been acquired by him. This is an assumption which works very well when applied to the insects and other lower forms of life, to which the biologists have given so large a part of their attention, but it is open to serious objections when applied to so highly plastic a being as man with his great capacity for learning and with society's varied machinery and resources for offering stimuli

for imitation, which lead constantly to new uniformities of human nature based on habit training. It is interesting to note that the author might have supported his major contentions just as effectively by an appeal to the new educational and social psychology as to the old biology. Economic science has still another step to take before it reaps the harvest prepared for it by the new psychology.

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*The Higher Individualism.* By EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. Pp. 162.

This book consists of eight sermons preached at Harvard University. "Though not conceived with reference to a general plan, the sermons express certain fundamental ideas characteristic of the constructive tendency in current religious teaching—such as the social nature of the individual, the religious significance of social service, and the modern meaning of regeneration, inspiration, mysticism, and the quest for life." Briefly, Professor Ames has translated the traditional categories of religion into terms of social service.

In this sense it seems that religion consists very largely in busy-ness. The modern commands of Jesus to his disciples are, "Go, teach; build schools and colleges; . . . found hospitals and laboratories, and dispensaries; . . . found settlements and peace societies and boards of arbitration; publish the poetry of love; dramatize the prodigal son and the good Samaritan, etc."—in brief, Go, organize something, and demonstrate the gospel of efficiency. Two or three passages suggest that life reaches its climax on the football field, and one wonders whether in "the quest of life" the author is not thinking of "seeing life." When we somehow connect all of this with "the infinite compassion that throbs at the heart of the world," it seems that we realize "the mystical quality of religion."

Such a conception of religion must be somewhat disconcerting to old-fashioned piety, and even the profane may wonder why it needs the name of religion. Granting that social service plays an important part in life, it seems nevertheless that from a specifically religious standpoint life demands that the busy world of here and now be viewed *sub specie eternitatis*; and this implies a certain element of other-worldliness, a certain detachment, in thought at least, from the passing show, a communing of the spirit, traditionally associated with prayer in the closet and the still small voice—in short, an "inner" life which appears to be